This is the first in a series of pieces in which I review Ravens General Manager Eric DeCosta. Simply, how productive and effective has DeCosta been?
Now DeCosta has reaped the reputational benefits of having worked for and with Hall of Fame GM Ozzie Newsome. But is that gloss from the shine of Newsome’s career deserved? How has DeCosta performed so far? In this first piece I look at DeCosta’s first draft, the class of 2019.
Analytical Methodology
Retrospective draft evaluation is not simply a product of reviewing individual selections and determining whether individual players produced draft value. Teams have an aggregate amount of draft capital to spend, and the proper consideration is whether the aggregate capital spent produced value, and to what extent. This means that I don’t just look at individual picks in isolation. After all, there are misses in every draft by every team – that’s to be expected. It’s the picks as a group that should be evaluated. Essentially, did a general manager expend his total draft capital wisely? Did he generate an aggregate value above the aggregate value of his draft slots?
Another way to look at this is through the concepts of batting average and slugging percentage. Now both are important, as batting average is how you build depth and slugging percentage is how you build quality. I believe that slugging percentage is at a higher premium at the top part of the draft. A GM really has to get star-quality here. Batting average is a larger contributor to team success in the bottom portion of the draft.
Breaking the Draft Into Two Parts
As an aid to this overall approach, I like to break drafts apart into a top and a bottom, drawing the dividing line around pick 127 (about halfway through the draft). Why? For one, there is a general consensus among observers in the top part of the draft regarding which players have the greatest NFL potential. Therefore, at the top part of the draft the key for most general managers is getting his comparative-value draft board order correct, i.e., which of these generally-consensus players will provide higher quality versus the others? This is also the place where GMs target their teams’ most glaring needs (notwithstanding the claim of “best player” available).
Regarding selections in the top half of the draft, I expect picks of high-quality players in exchange for the bulk of expended draft capital. Generally, if one or two of the top half picks generate little if any value, then that failure can be overcome if one or more of the other high picks winds up as Pro Bowl caliber; or strong starters who warrant a second contract.
For picks in the bottom half, GMs generally have to look a lot harder to find value. There is typically an absence of consensus as to value (i.e., a higher variability over GM-perceived value), placing a higher premium on the GM finding that value. From an evaluation perspective I focus on whether the GM succeeded/failed in finding fair value and hidden gems, and how frequently he found players who consistently contribute. Of course, the hit rate on pick selections will be lower, but the GM must get enough hits or his team will lack depth. And the same theory applies with the signing of undrafted free agents.
Review of Ravens’ General Manager Eric Decosta – Ravens’ 2019 Draft Retrospective
Who would have thought that DeCosta’s 2019 draft, his first in charge, would yield so little in the aggregate? DeCosta enjoyed six of the first 127 picks that year, plus two others. Here’s who he selected:
Top-Part of the Draft:
- Round 1, Pick 25: Marquise Brown, WR
- Round 3, Pick 85: Jaylon Ferguson, 3/4 linebacker
- Round 3, Pick 93: Miles Boykin, WR
- Round 4, Pick 113: Justice Hill, RB
- Round 4, Pick 123: Ben Powers, OG
- Round 4, Pick 127: Iman Marshall, CB
Bottom-Part of the Draft:
- Round 5, Pick 160: Daylon Mack, DT
- Round 6, Pick 197: Trace McSorley, QB
I’ll start with an individual review of the picks before aggregating.
Top Part of the Draft:
The Ravens entered this first DeCosta draft in dire need of wide receiver help. DeCosta spent a very significant amount of his draft capital on the two selections of Marquise Brown and Miles Boykin.
Marquise Brown
Brown has been a valuable contributor to the Ravens over his three seasons, but not worthy of the 25th pick in the draft. Mind you, Brown was the first wide receiver drafted in the class, so the Ravens had their pick of the litter. In my view, the Ravens passed on a bevy of more productive pass catchers. The likes of A.J. Brown (drafted 51st), Deebo Samuel (drafted 36th), and D.K. Metcalfe (drafted 64th) have all been more impactful. Even Terry McLaurin (drafted 76th) would deserve consideration above Marquise Brown. Then there’s Diontae Johnson (drafted 66th) who, with a strong-armed quarterback could well be more impactful than Marquise.
Brown, in retrospect, was over-drafted. Now, I am a Brown fan – he stretches the field like few others in the league and has more potential crossing the field than the Ravens have exploited thus far in his career. But big drops have been too prominent, as has a general unwillingness to take on defenders after the catch. In fairness, I believe Brown was a second-round talent and his selection at 25 was far from a strikeout. It just wasn’t a home run. The draft capital expended was more than the value received.
What could DeCosta have done in hindsight? The obvious retrospective conclusion is a trade-back, picking up more selections, and then still selecting A.J. Brown, Samuel, or Metcalfe. Given the Ravens’ glaring wide receiver need at the time, it’s unrealistic to reconsider pick 25 as anything other than a wide receiver.
In all, the return on Brown was good, but did not equal the draft capital spent, especially when you consider that the Ravens could have had a better receiver and an additional pick.
Miles Boykin
Boykin’s selection at 93 was a bust. And in many ways that outcome is not that surprising. Boykin’s Notre Dame career was far from noteworthy; his production was just ok and was essentially limited to only seven games. He was a “traits” pick, at 6’ 2” and 215 or so pounds. Boykin was a “projection” at the outset. Sure, he’s turned out to be an excellent blocker and an outstanding gunner on special teams. But at pick 93?
Who could the Ravens have selected at wideout instead of Boykin? Admittedly, the pickings turned out to be slim. There was Hunter Renfrow at pick 149, Darius Slayton at 171, and Terry Godwin at 237. But there were no big-bodied wideouts available after Boykin’s pick who made any NFL impact. In retrospect, I believe the Boykin pick was a good example of DeCosta picking out of need. But no matter what the reason, Miles Boykin at pick 93 provided little to no value to this point in his career. And there is little likelihood that Boykin will be a member of the 2022 Ravens, particularly given his cap number.
In all, the draft capital spent on Boykin produced nominal value. This was a swing and a miss.
Jaylon Ferguson
There’s really not much to defend about Ferguson’s selection at pick 85. He contributed virtually nothing over three seasons. Impact plays outside of a special teams’ block were rarer than a pass-defensed by Patrick Queen. There was never a more misleading moniker than “sack-daddy” for a player with zero pass rushing moves. He has no more chance of turning into a poor-man’s Zadarius Smith than Tim Williams. Would you rather have drafted Maxx Crosby (pick 106)? Now, I’m not going to pin that oversight on DeCosta any more than any of the other 30 GMs who passed on Crosby in the first 105 picks. It’s just that Ferguson gave the Ravens no value at pick 85. A complete bust.
Ferguson has turned out to be a very back-of-the-roster player. And at pick 85, a good slice of the Ravens draft capital, they received nothing in exchange.
Justice Hill
Justice Hill provided scant more value than Ferguson, albeit with a lot less draft capital expended. Hill was expected to be a one-cut explosion who could take it to the house. And catch a few passes to boot, too. I can’t fault DeCosta for the fact that Hill has seemingly spent more time in the trainer’s room than on the field. But when given the chance, Hill’s production was trivial. A similar, and far better running back, was selected just 15 picks after Hill. I bet that DeCosta still has nightmares about putting Tony Pollard below Hill on his draft board. Hill, when healthy, was a very solid special teams cover-man. But it’s an easy call to say that he, like Ferguson, has been a bust, with little to any productivity gained. His appearance on the Ravens’ 2022 roster would be a surprise at this point.
In all, the draft capital expended did not yield an equal-value return.
Ben Powers
With Ben Powers, the Ravens at least received some value. Powers started a slew of games for the Ravens in 2021 because of injuries. He failed to win the job outright on his own. I saw little out of Powers’ performance to cause me, or likely anyone else, to foresee him as a starting left guard in 2022. He just doesn’t offer all that much, whether trying to pull in space, getting to the second level, or attempting to protect Lamar (good luck there). I expect Ben Cleveland to take that job. Admittedly Powers’ cap number for 2022 may make it hard for him to ultimately make the club, pending the health of Cleveland and Tyre Phillips. Nevertheless, Powers is a back-of-the-roster type of player.
But Powers provided some value for the capital expended. So, I won’t clobber DeCosta for this pick.
Iman Marshall – Who?
Iman Marshall was the last top-half pick in 2019. Now injuries are never predictable, and three years in a row is quite an accomplishment for Marshall. Who know if he offers any hope in 2022? He’ll likely get a shot but certainly isn’t part of the 2022 plans. DeCosta can’t be blamed for Marshall’s misfortune. But, as it turns out, the Ravens got nothing for the capital expended on Marshall.
The Top Half Aggregate
In the aggregate, I believe the Ravens completely missed on Ferguson, got little value for Hill, only slightly more for Boykin, decent value for Powers, and nothing for Marshall. It’s safe to say that the aggregate value received for these players was far less than the aggregate draft capital invested.
And although I believe that Brown was a strong pick, the draft capital at 25 was likely greater than Brown’s value to date. He is a consistent strong starter, as one would expect. And he still has a slight chance to reach Pro Bowl caliber. Taking that into account, for now I’ll grant that Brown isn’t that far off from potentially offering the Ravens even more value.
So who among this group warrants a second contract from the Ravens? Brown for sure. Ferguson and Boykin definitely not. Hill is unlikely. Powers has a shot as a depth piece. And Marshall is likely gone.
In total, the draft capital spent in the top half of the draft was not spent wisely. DeCosta’s performance was not good on his first attempt. It wouldn’t be a total surprise if the Ravens’ 2022 roster included only Brown from this group.
Review of Eric DeCosta – The Bottom Half of the Draft
The Ravens had just two picks here, but DeCosta missed on both.
Daylon Mack was just bad – very bad. He was shoved around from the moment he took the field in exhibition games. It’s hard to imagine what DeCosta saw there. Mack provided zero return on invested draft capital.
As it turns out, the outcome for Trace McSorley wasn’t much better. He’s just not an NFL quarterback, which was not surprising. He didn’t show much in his senior year at Penn State to suggest that he was an NFL caliber quarterback. He has a middling arm and can’t put the ball into tight windows. His accuracy is mediocre. Granted, at pick 197 and the last Ravens’ pick at that, he was essentially a free agent who the Ravens wanted to control. I get that. But I just don’t know why they wanted him. Now sure, one could point out that he played a (very) little and managed to hang around on the practice squad until the Cardinals took him for depth concerns. But that’s the profile of an undrafted free agent. That’s not the type of player to acquire with draft capital.
From a batting average perspective, DeCosta took two swings in the bottom half of the draft and whiffed both times.
Review of Eric Decosta – The Undrafted Free Agents
Signing undrafted free agents is where GMs with the eye for finding gems earn their keep. This is where you spend time, but not draft capital. In my view these signings should not be considered in evaluating draft success. But they are a very important consideration in evaluating a GMs ability to build his roster. I group it in here for that purpose, and do not consider it as part of DeCosta’s draft success/failure.
In 2019, this is where DeCosta excelled. He enjoyed three hits out of this group – Patrick Mekari, Antoine Wesley, and Otaro Alaka.
Mekari has become a major Ravens’ contributor and the equivalent, in my view, of a third-round selection to this point in his career. This was a major score by DeCosta.
Wesley has become an NFL contributor, stepping in this year for the Cardinals when DeAndre Hopkins went down and providing the type of play he illustrated in training camp for the Ravens. He’s a big bodied receiver who is making more of a receiving impact, to this point, than Boykin. Granted, he didn’t make the Ravens in 2019, but that was the judgment of the coaches. DeCosta gets high marks for spotting the talent and signing him.
Alaka made the Ravens team in 2019 and showed talent. Injuries have derailed his career to date. Nevertheless, DeCosta did a good job signing Alaka.
For what it’s worth, DeCosta signed arguably (by some) the most highly regarded undrafted free agent, Gerald Willis, the defensive tackle from Miami. Many observers saw Willis as being worthy of second-day draft consideration. Although Willis was cut and never made it in the league, DeCosta gets my praise for winning the battle to acquire Willis in the first place.
Overall Conclusion – A Poor Output
The review of Eric DeCosta and his performance in the 2019 draft shows disappointing results. DeCosta largely missed in this draft. His overall slugging percentage was poor. Only one player (Brown) provided significant value and is a consistent starter although he was drafted too high. DeCosta’s batting average was also subpar, as none – zero – of his other picks became consistent starters or valuable contributors, albeit some value was generated from Boykin and Powers.
Overall, this was a poor performance from a slugging percentage perspective. Particularly when you consider that he had just one big result in the top half of the draft – only one consistent starter. DeCosta’s batting average was a bit better but unfortunately that was the result of drafting depth-type players with top-end draft capital, and missing completely in the bottom half of the draft.
What do you think?
