This is the first of two pieces that look at the Ravens roster construction for the coming season. That roster will look much different than the 2021 version, particularly on defense. By my count (see below), the Ravens need nine starters and seven contributing backups. This is a lot to get done. Even with ten draft picks it’s unrealistic to expect the Ravens will fill more than four starter holes. Indeed, four starters would actually be a strong draft haul. I previously reviewed Eric DeCosta’s 2019 draft haul, which is here. Continue reading “Ravens Roster Construction 2022 – Free Agency, Part 1”
A Review of Ravens GM Eric DeCosta, Part 1 – The 2019 Ravens Draft
This is the first in a series of pieces in which I review Ravens General Manager Eric DeCosta. Simply, how productive and effective has DeCosta been?
Now DeCosta has reaped the reputational benefits of having worked for and with Hall of Fame GM Ozzie Newsome. But is that gloss from the shine of Newsome’s career deserved? How has DeCosta performed so far? In this first piece I look at DeCosta’s first draft, the class of 2019.
Analytical Methodology
Retrospective draft evaluation is not simply a product of reviewing individual selections and determining whether individual players produced draft value. Teams have an aggregate amount of draft capital to spend, and the proper consideration is whether the aggregate capital spent produced value, and to what extent. This means that I don’t just look at individual picks in isolation. After all, there are misses in every draft by every team – that’s to be expected. It’s the picks as a group that should be evaluated. Essentially, did a general manager expend his total draft capital wisely? Did he generate an aggregate value above the aggregate value of his draft slots? Continue reading “A Review of Ravens GM Eric DeCosta, Part 1 – The 2019 Ravens Draft”
Who Founded the United States of America? Listen First, Then Speak
These days people have differences of opinion over the most basic questions. It is so bad that it seems as if they cannot agree even over whether the sky is blue. Which leads me to a simple difference of opinion over the basic historical question of who “founded” the United States – Europeans or Native Americans? In one corner of this dispute sits former Senator Rick Santorum. In the other corner rests CNN anchor Don Lemon. Their argument, in the end, is really about the meaning of a simple word. It is an illustration as to how people talk right past each other – intentionally or not – and the inability to hear what the other person is saying.
In this little blog piece, I’ll first lay out the simple debate. Then, I’ll illustrate the difficulty people have recognizing that a single English language word has different meaning, leading to antagonism, personal enmity, and worse. And finally, I’ll answer the historical question. Continue reading “Who Founded the United States of America? Listen First, Then Speak”
Ravens 2021 Post-Draft Takeaways
What follows are a few Ravens 2021 post-draft takeaways.
Major Observation
The Ravens 2021 draft selections tip their hand a bit, in my view, regarding the shape of the offensive strategy for the 2021 season. For one, the obvious. The Ravens just allocated a lot of draft capital to the passing game. Rashod Bateman in the first round, Ben Cleveland in the third round (see below) and Tylan Wallace in the fourth round tells us a great deal about the Ravens’ thinking. Diversification is coming. More balance in the attack without eschewing the run. Continue reading “Ravens 2021 Post-Draft Takeaways”
Ravens 2021 Comprehensive Draft Guide
This Ravens 2021 Comprehensive Draft Guide is an analysis of draft strategies and selections for the Ravens. It is written solely from the perspective of the Ravens. It considers the current Ravens roster and focuses on players that fit within, and will add to, the anticipated focus of the Ravens for the 2021 season. It rates prospective draftees only from the perspective of the Ravens’ needs and approaches. Accordingly, certain players who may otherwise be ranked highly by third parties in the context of their particularly skill sets are devalued in this report because, among other reasons, their skill sets do not address the Ravens’ needs and strategies.
Because the focus is strictly on the Ravens, given their current roster composition, an analysis of quarterback prospects this year is completely omitted.
This year was particularly challenging, as many players opted out in 2020 – leaving much less information to evaluate with. As a result, there are far more “projections” than normal. So let’s dig in.
Part I – Potential Ravens’ Scenarios in the First Round
Biden’s Leadership and the Georgia Voting Law
It is easy to claim virtue. A politician can cloak himself in honesty and integrity. He can shout words of unity from the bully pulpit. But simple words without action easily mist away in the cauldron of politics. At least they do when uttered without sincerity and meaning. And that brings us to President Biden’s leadership – the man who claims to unify us all – and the new Georgia election law.
The problem here is not the Georgia law per se. There is no need to review that law in any detail. It is well reviewed and discussed elsewhere. But there is nothing in that law that impairs any person’s ability to vote. Claims to the contrary are dishonest. They are Chicken Little whining wrapped in bald political gain seeking.
It’s All About Character
The problem here is President Unity’s character. The imagery surrounding George Washington was of a man who could not lie. When Washington spoke, his sincerity was never questioned. Integrity – the root of all sincere character – begins and ends with honesty. And if a person intends to lead without it, then he will persuade no one. He will lead from behind. He will divide, not mend.
President Biden’s leadership, in the face of the benign Georgia law, started with name-calling, added in a wolfpack of false claims, and ended by calling for – and getting – punishment. A crass display of political hectoring that discarded claims of integrity and honesty into a toxic miasma.
His “official remarks” started with playground name calling: “This law,” he said, “like so many others being pursued by Republicans in statehouses across the country, is a blatant attack on the Constitution and good conscience.” Those Republicans – all Republicans after all – are unconscionable rapscallions. Then he went a little further. As he put it, “what I’m worried about is how un-American this whole initiative is.” So, you see, the people with whom he would unify do not believe in American ideals. They are less than American.
What better way to further bind the wounds of division then with the soaring – and burning – rhetorical imagery of decades long since passed and slavery itself. Why those un-American Republicans brought us nothing less than “Jim Crow in the 21st Century.” They would return us to slavery itself if they could. By golly, they bring us nothing less than an “atrocity.” Perhaps millions will die. This new law is so horribly un-American that it even shames “Jim Crow.” Those evil Republicans, President Unity shouted, have brought us the father of all Jim Crow – why, it is “Jim Eagle” himself.
Leaders Without Integrity Lack Moral Authority
Then, there’s President Unity’s “misstatements” about what’s in the Georgia law. Even the Washington Post reviewed some of those lies, offering up the dreaded four Pinocchios for his tall tale about the law ending voting hours early. And forget not the wrong claim that “you can’t provide water for people about to vote.” Think about the imagery here, people collapsing from thirst while waiting to cast their precious ballots. Grossly irresponsible.
Where is the judgment behind President Unity’s subsequent call for punishment? So this is where Biden’s leadership takes us. A President of the United States calling for an economic boycott of one of the fifty states. Talk about opening a Pandora’s Box of hatred. President Unity dropped wisdom right into the commode on this one, and then he flushed. From now and forever more it must make sense – in unifying the country after all – for a President who has a policy disagreement with the leaders of any State to bring the boycott hammer to the debate. Dick Enberg could say it no better: “Oh my!”
Lead on, President Unity! Next time, bring a hammer. Or better yet, a guillotine.
An Insurrection Without Firearms? – Lack of Protection is a Disgrace
What happened on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021? Some see an insurrection. They see an unprecedented intentional, pre-meditated rebellion tied directly to sedition by the former president. Others see a crowd that morphed into a mob with a bunch of very bad apples mixed in. The bad apples, they say, purposively turned violent. Originally disorganized protesters embedded with extremists. Political pundits and opinionizers will paint their interpretations of events from whichever colors they mix from their pallets. But was there an insurrection without firearms?
The Facts – An Insurrection Without Firearms
To historians (if there are any left with integrity), real facts are all that matter. They have to find and follow the evidence. So, consider these facts. As of this writing, no one who entered the Capitol building had a firearm. Not a single person. We know this by reviewing all the indictments and arrest records of each of the individuals charged so far.
And what does that record reveal? Numerous persons are charged with carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon. But in each of those cases the “weapons” were anything other than firearms. Some people used riot shields. Some had poles. In one case a person had a taser. There were other miscellaneous items.
There was one instance of a person (Lonnie Coffman) on the Capitol steps who was observed by a policeman carrying in his pocket an unlicensed pistol, but he was immediately chased and never made it inside the building. Another person (William Watson) was found to have mace and a pocketknife. He made it inside the Capitol, but Capitol Police acknowledged that Watson tried to help calm the crowd. Hardly the behavior of a man intended on a coup d’état.
Christopher Alberts had a firearm that day. But he also did not get inside the building. Then there was Grant Moore. His parked vehicle near the Capitol contained a pistol found in a backpack sitting in the passenger seat.
And that is it. No one was arrested or charged with carrying a firearm of any type into the Capitol building that day. Not a single pistol. No revolvers. No automatic weapons. There was not a single firearm – no guns at all.
Now we do not belittle the riot that day. It was totally unacceptable at any level. Peaceful protest is the hallmark of dissent. Violence is the bludgeon of authoritarians. No doubt that events spiraled out of control on January 6th. The Capitol Police were horribly unprepared.
But the facts show (so far) that no one inside of that building that day was carrying a firearm (other than the Capitol Police themselves). An insurrection without firearms? Maybe in the 15th century, but hardly imaginable in the 21st century.
We do not quibble with fists – they are dangerous weapons in their own rights. But let us be realistic. Can anyone imagine organizing and executing an overthrow of the United States government without any firearms? Fists are not the weapons of “rebels” intending to take the Capitol. What we witnessed that day, and history will ultimately record, was largely a mob running wild – and a police force that, for reasons unexplainable so far, was grossly unprepared to contain that mob.
Complete Breakdown of Defense
The American people deserve a serious explanation. Not so much, perhaps, about what people in that crowd did that day. Most of it is on video tape. Rather, the American people demand an understanding as to how the Capitol Police could be overwhelmed so easily. How could the Capitol and its occupants, under any circumstances, be left effectively unprotected? (Seriously – they deployed waist-high metal barriers that a solid 13-year-old could knock over with his feet). Especially since days earlier, as no one disputes, they were warned that protests were coming. Even the former President had pre-authorized the National Guard for protection.
It is all a complete disgrace. Who was involved in the “defense” planning before that day? The Speaker of the House? The Capitol Police Chief? Was the Army involved? Who else? There was a complete breakdown of vision, strategy, and deployment. Because if there had been an organized attack on the Capitol building that day, replete with real firearms, a lot of people would have died. And that must be unimaginable in the United States. It must be.
Late Impeachment of a Former President is Unconstitutional
Article 2, Section 4 of the Constitution provides: “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” This language is clear and unambiguous. It means that former Presidents, because they are not “[t]he President”, may not be convicted under the impeachment provisions. We have written about this previously. Late impeachment arguments fail.
Here, we look at the primary arguments against this position. We focus on the claims set forth in Brian Kalt’s 2001 article in the Texas Review of Law and Politics entitled “The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former Federal Officials: An Analysis of the Law, History, and Practice of Late Impeachment.” Kalt made three principal arguments in support of the impeachment of ex-Officers of the United States.
Article 2 of the Constitution Intentionally Excludes Impeachment of a Former President: Late Impeachment is Impermissible
As a threshold matter, Kalt maintains that the plain language of Article 2, Section 4 does not resolve the issue. He notes that claims reliant upon the plain meaning of Article 2 are “a sort of expressio unius description of impeachment that mentions who can be impeached and for what, and that implicitly excludes any other subjects not listed.” (Expressio unius effectively means that the express mentioning of subjects within a list excludes all other subjects not mentioned.) This, of course, is an underpinning to the (and our) argument reliant upon the plain meaning of Article 2.
The problem with this, Kalt maintains, is that the Constitution goes cold regarding the timing of an impeachment and trial. An expressio unius reading of the Article 2 language, by definition, prohibits the trial of a former President because a former President is not included in the Article 2 expressio unius list. That conclusion is correct and goes to the very heart of the matter.
Madison’s Role
The difficulty for Kalt is that he is stuck with the Constitutional language. The language of Article 2 is specific. Within Kalt’s second argument supporting late impeachment (discussed below) he cites to the impeachment language of various colonies’ and states’ constitutions. We mention this point here because the constitutions of two of those states (Virginia and Vermont) specifically authorized late impeachments. And this fact is very important to an expressio unius argument to the extent that historical arguments are relied upon, as Kalt would like to do.
It is critical because the draftsmen of the Constitution were certainly aware of those constitutions. And they were also aware that, by contrast, the balance of those constitutions did not authorize late impeachments. This is more notable because James Madison was one of the principal draftsmen of the Virginia constitution. The Virginia constitution specifically allowed for late impeachment. Madison later became the lead draftsman for the U.S. Constitution that specifically did not include late impeachment.
These facts make it difficult to dismiss an expressio unius argument. Madison’s crafting of the Constitutional language was intentional. As a result, one cannot ignore that an expressio unius reading of the text prohibits late impeachments.
A Policy Argument Has No Place in the EXPRESSIO UNIUS Analysis
Yes, as Kalt claims an expressio unius reading of the Constitutional language may weaken the deterrent effects of impeachment. But that is a policy argument. Dismissing away the expressio unius argument based on the consequences of a plain language meaning is just a re-writing of the Constitution. And the Senate does not have that power. We discuss that a bit further below.
In all, that Madison had previously authored the Virginia constitution is significant and overlooked by other commentators. The fact that he as draftsman authorized impeachment of former officers in Virginia is important. It is powerful support for the view that the text of Article 2, which does not include late impeachments, must be read as intentionally expressio unius. These are the facts, like it or not. Late impeachment arguments fail under an expressio unius approach.
The Principal Arguments Supporting Late Impeachment
Now we turn to Kalt’s three arguments.
First Argument: Policy
First, he recognizes that “[t]extually, the Constitution does not address the appropriate timing of impeachments.” As a result, he makes a structural claim that “late impeachment provides a more coherent and sensible framework for the timing of impeachment. Barring late impeachment would weaken the deterrent effect of impeachment and would allow malfeasors [sic] and Presidents to nullify Congress’s impeachment powers in a way that is incompatible with the Constitution’s structure.”
This first argument is simply a policy claim. Kalt maintains that the textual language is flawed and impairs the deterrent effects of impeachment. His policy claim may be valid. But it cannot then be assumed that the Constitutional draftsmen were unaware of this. As noted, Madison certainly knew that the Constitutional language excluded late impeachments. Yet, even if the draftsmen were unaware, technical or structural “flaws” in the Constitution cannot and must not be “repaired” by the Senate. There is a precise mechanism within the Constitution for making changes.
Second Argument: pre-constitutional History
Second, Kalt makes an argument based on history. He relies on the history of impeachment in Great Britain. Kalt looks to the constitutions of various of the American colonies and states. He maintains that this history reveals that late impeachment was utilized before the Constitution was drafted. He also references in some detail comments made at the Constitutional Convention.
Kalt recited wonderful historical detail within these subjects. But pre-Constitutional history has no bearing on the meaning of the Constitutional language. The text speaks for itself. Kalt’s historical argument is an attempt to add another leg to the stool that there are policy flaws within the Constitutional text. He may succeed. But that has no bearing on the Constitutional language.
Third Argument: Impeachment History
Third, Kalt points to the history of impeachment cases as “subsequent precedential support for late impeachment, not least the fact that the Senate once ruled specifically that it had jurisdiction over a late impeachment trial.” But the Senate claiming that it has authority to conduct a late impeachment trial does not mean that it has such authority under the Constitution. The Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to weigh in.
The Senate claimed jurisdiction in the well-known Belknap case, where it tried a former executive branch member. But Belknap, as Kalt notes, is a controversial precedent. For one, it is not binding on a future Senate. In addition, the minority that voted against jurisdiction “did not feel bound by the majority, and Belknap’s acquittal was necessarily based on the fact that his was a late impeachment.” Further, given that Belknap was acquitted, there was no opportunity or reason for the Supreme Court to consider the constitutional question.
Kalt also cited as precedent late impeachment cases involving judges. But these references are not relevant. The judiciary is not covered within the Article II provisions which apply only to Officers of the executive branch. The impeachment of judges is covered within Article III of the Constitution.
In the end, the bulk of Kalt’s arguments are policy observations and claims. He makes well-reasoned arguments as to why the impeachment provisions in the Constitution should cover ex-Presidents (and other former Officers). Indeed, we concur with Kalt on several of those arguments. But the challenge for those arguments is the limiting language of the Constitution itself.
If There are Flaws in the Constitutional Structure, Corrections May Only be Made Via a Constitutional Amendment – Not By Senate Fiat
It is not for the Congress, or the courts, to fill-in the arguable “holes” in the Constitution. It should not be for them to “correct” perceived Constitutional infirmities. Courts, as an example, have far too often taken it upon themselves to undertake this type of exercise – unconstitutionally. Changes to the Constitution to fill in perceived gaps, both procedural and substantive, must be undertaken through the Constitutionally authorized amendment process. Only an amendment to the Constitution, particularly for something as consequential as removal of a President or barring a person from holding the office of the presidency, is the only Constitutionally satisfactory manner to address these deficiencies. Congress alone does not have the power to alter the impeachment mechanism.
The “Powers” Argument Favoring Late Impeachment
Other arguments have been made to support late impeachments. The primary argument rests on the view that because Article I grants the impeachment “power” to the Congress, only Congress may decide how to exercise that power. This is an “inherent” power claim, i.e., that the power of Congress to convict an ex-President “is implicit in Article I’s impeachment power” as one commentator has claimed.
Let us be clear as to Article I’s meaning. Indisputably, Article I grants certain powers to the Congress regarding impeachment. In relevant part it provides that “The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of Impeachment . . . The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” Once convicted, Article I specifies that a judgment of conviction “shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office . . . under the United States.”
But the “powers” granted by Article I are twofold. First, they are jurisdictional. Congress, and Congress alone, has the power to impeach and convict. It is not a power vested in the judicial branch of government. Second, the powers granted include choice of the applicable remedies upon conviction.
Let us also be clear what Article I is not. It does not specify, in any manner, the persons subject to Congressional jurisdiction. That is where Article II comes into play. The provisions of Article II alone addressing the executive branch specify who is subject to that Congressional jurisdiction. As we argued previously, Article II is specific, clear, and unambiguous. Only “the President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States” are subject to the impeachment jurisdiction of the Congress.
A jurisdictional claim has been made regarding Article II. The simple claim is that Article II itself is a jurisdictional provision. But on the plain meaning of the language in both Article I and Article II, this is incorrect. It is odd to base a Congressional jurisdiction argument on the provisions of Article II, which deal with the executive branch of government. Article II jurisdictional claims are easily dismissed.
In all, an argument based on the “power” provisions of Article I is spurious.
Conclusion
The Constitution does not permit late impeachments. The language in Article 2 of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Madison, as principal draftsman, knew what he was doing. He had co-authored the Virginia constitution which specifically allowed for late impeachments. We are stuck with the language of the Constitution as it is.
There may be holes in the Constitutional impeachment structure. That can be fairly debated. But that is the point after all. The matter should be debated, resolved by the Congress, and then put to the American people under the Constitutionally mandated amendment provisions. It is not for the Senate alone to resolve this issue as its current majority sees fit. Constitutional fidelity does not permit it.
Impeachment Trial – The President Pro Tempore May Not Preside
The Senate’s President Pro Tempore may not preside at the impeachment trial of a former President of the United States. If a former President may be impeached and tried, only the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to preside over the trial. The appointment of the President Pro Tempore to preside in the impeachment trial of the former President violates the Constitution.
In relevant part, Article I provides that “When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside.” There is no ambiguity of language, which is directive and mandatory. No one other than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may preside over the trial of the President. The argument claiming otherwise is unsupportable. Here is why.
If a Former President is Impeachable, It is Because He Was “The President”
Whether a former President of the United States may be impeached and convicted under is the subject of debate. The literal language of the Constitution does not specify whether a former President is covered. But commentators have argued, for a variety of reasons, that former Presidents are covered.
Article 2 of the Constitution states that “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” (emphasis added). On its plain meaning, this language does not include a former President as a person subject to impeachment.
To overcome this failure, the argument favoring inclusion of a former President within the Constitutional term is as follows. Because “the text of the Constitution does not clearly and directly address the proper timing of impeachment, it is necessary to consult history, structure, and precedent to address the question of late impeachment.” (citing here to the 2001 article “The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former Federal Officials…” by Brian Kalt). For our purposes, “late impeachment” means the trial of a person who once was President, but is no longer the President at the time of trial.
Whether a former President is subject to the impeachment provisions of the Constitution is the subject of a separate analysis. But in the end, any “history, structure, and precedent” arguments that go beyond the stated language of Article 2 must place a former President within a “penumbra” of the Article 2 language. The analysis must conclude, in the end, that a former President may be impeached solely because he was “the President.” The phrase “the President” must include both sitting and former Presidents. This must be the case. If that is so, then the trial of “the President” (which phrase includes a former President) must be presided over by the Chief Justice. The Constitution is plain on this point. No other conclusion is supportable.
The Appointment of the President Pro Tempore Violates the Constitution
The appointment of the President Pro Tempore as the presiding officer in the impeachment trial of a former President violates the Constitution. Nowhere in the Constitution is a power to preside granted to the President Pro Tempore. Indeed, there is no language in the Constitution that even suggests that this claimed power exists.
Some have claimed that the impeachment trial of a judge, wherein the President Pro Tempore presided, is relevant precedent. But that is incorrect. Impeachment trials of judges are not relevant precedents because such impeachments are not covered by Article 2 of the Constitution. Article 2 impeachment applies strictly to Officers in the executive branch. And, the provisions in Article 1, (“[w]hen the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside”) are mandatory.
The Senate may not simply take it upon itself to refuse the Constitutional mandate. It may not claim that a judicial impeachment precedent overcomes the Constitutional mandate with respect to the President. Indeed, there is no place for that argument at all. The President Pro Tempore may not preside over the trial of “the President.” The Constitution could not be clearer.
The Senate Cannot Have it Both Ways
Remarkably, two entirely appositional arguments must be maintained by those who conclude that the President Pro Tempore may preside. As noted, to impeach a former President, he must be brought within the ambit of “the President” as specifically covered by Article 2. And we concede to that point for the sake or argument. But, having included an ex-President under the provisions applicable to “the President”, one cannot then shift into reverse gear and strip the Chief Justice of his mandated power to preside on the basis that the former President is no longer “the President” at the time of the trial.
The Senate is claiming jurisdiction over a former President because he was President. There are solid arguments to the effect that a former President cannot be tried under the impeachment provisions. But if he can, then the Chief Justice must preside. And the President Pro Tempore may not preside.
Impeachment of an Ex-President is Unconstitutional
Article 2, Section 4 of the Constitution governs impeachment. It provides that “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” This text is clear and unambiguous. Only a currently sitting President can be convicted of the crimes listed. A private citizen who had previously been President is not covered. Impeachment of an ex-President is impermissible. It is as simple as that.
The Constitution states that the impeachment and conviction provisions of Article 2 apply only to certain stated “Officers” of the United States. The clear language of Article 2 leaves no doubt regarding the Founders intent. The list of such Officers begins with “The President,” a capitalized term in the constitutional text.
The plain meaning of the language, with a direct reference to “[t]he President” [emphasis added] applies only to a person who is in fact the President. Any other claim is ab absurdo. An ex-President is not “the President” [emphasis added] encompassed by this Constitutional text.
Further to this point, the unambiguous language of the text states “[t]he President . . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction…” Again, as applied here the only person who “shall be removed from Office” is “the President”. And of course, by definition, a person who is not “the President” at the time of a conviction cannot be removed from Office because that person is not in the Office at the time of conviction.
The Constitutional text is plain and unambiguous. Only a tortured reading of the Article 2 language supports a claim that the text applies to anyone who is not “the President.” Only a further tortured reading of the Article 2 language supports a claim that someone who is not the President can nevertheless be removed from the Office upon conviction.
Alleged “Scholarly” Arguments Based on Article 1 are Spurious
Some constitutional “scholars” have argued that the provisions of Article 1 support the proposition that an ex-President may be convicted. But Article 1 is a remedy provision. It addresses the remedies that may apply to a President who has been convicted under Article 2. Without an Article 2 conviction, the Article 1 provisions do not come into play. Article 1 is therefore inapplicable unless, and until, a “judgment” of conviction has been rendered. (As a sidebar, so-called “scholars” are no more qualified to render a view on this issue than laymen. Indeed, there is too much deference granted to claimed “scholars”).
This Article 1 approach is indistinguishable from basing a legal cause of action upon the remedies available if the premises for the action are proven. Those types of complaints are dismissible on their face. And those types of bootstrap arguments carry no water. Grounding a claim that an ex-President is subject to an Article 2 trial within a “remedy” argument assumes away the initial Constitutional question. The threshold issue is whether impeachment of an ex-President can occur and whether and ex-President may be convicted. And this issue is resolved by reference to the plain language of Article 2.
There is no doubt that the Constitutional draftsmen only intended for the impeachment process to apply to sitting Officers of the United States. There is simply no logic that reasonably supports a different claim. Once a President is an ex-President, any need to remove him is gone.
Some claim that the impeachment process should cover an ex-President who is otherwise eligible under the Constitution to seek office once again, But that remedy is simply not grounded in the Constitution. Nor should it be. Those questions are best left for the people to decide at the ballot box.